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NOTES AND COMMENTS
PRACTICE
TRIAL PRACTICE - IMPROPER ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL
PROMPTED BY IMPROPRIETY OF OPPOSING COUNSEL.
On the voir dire examination of a juror, in a wrongful death action,
it was revealed that the defendant carried automobile liability insurance.'
Counsel for the plaintiff, taking advantage of this revelation, made
frequent references throughout the rest of the voir dre to the fact that
opposing counsel was representing an insurance company. No objection
to this was made, but counsel for the defendant, in his opening state-
ment made use of another important discovery brought out during the
questioning of the jurors-namely, that ten of those finally selected
carried liability insurance. With this in mind, one of his arguments
was to the effect that if too many plaintiffs won cases because the
defendants were insured, the rates of the policies would increase. This
was promptly objected to, but the presiding judge merely told the
defendant's lawyer to cease speaking along this line, and instructed the
jury that arguments were not to be considered as evidence. On appeal
it was held that the opening statement contained no prejudicial error.
The court said that taken by itself, it was undoubtedly improper,2 but
since it was provoked by the references to insurance made by the
plaintiff's counsel, the statement was not such that it would have
influenced the jury.
While this holding is in accord with many other Ohio decisions on
the subject,' as well as the weight of authority in the United States,'
a further analysis of leading Ohio cases is necessary for a fuller under-
standing of the rule. Some Ohio courts of review have looked no
further after finding that the improper argument of one attorney was
directly traceable to statements or argument of opposing counsel.'
'Bruno v. Petrecca, 6S Ohio App. 257, IS Ohio Op. 430 (1940).
' For a complete discussion of what constitutes improper argument of counsel see 39
OHIo JUR. 694-7245 64 C.J. z5o-z96.
SPresti v. Cleve. Ry., z6 Ohio App. 536, i6o N.E. 508 (1928); Ross v. State, 2z
Ohio App. 304, 153 N.E. 865 (x926); Lake Shore Electric Co. v. Ordway, 24. Ohio App.
317, x56 N.E. 235, 40 Ohio L. Abs. 763 (5926); Sperry v. Allen, 1s1 Ohio C.C. (N.S.)
2z5, 24 Ohio C.D. 30z (911); Cleveland Worsted Mills v. Coates, z6 Ohio C.C. (N.S.)
353, 3o Ohio C.D. 6xo (x916); Palmer v. Peak, 104 Ohio St. 603, 136 N.E. 884 (1922);
Metzler v. Youngstown, 23 Ohio L. Abs. S86 (1936); Highway Constr. Co. v. Eber, 7
Ohio L. Abs. 58 (1922); Champney v. Braun, 23 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 533, 34 Ohio C.D.
363 (191z); Dorger v. State, 40 Ohio App. 41, 179 N.E. 143 (1931); St. Bernard v.
Goham, so Ohio App. 402, 411, 31 Ohio C.A. 273 (1919).
'L.R.A. i918D, 1075 GOLD--EIN, TRIAL TECHNIQUE, p. 642; 64 C.J. 281.
'Highway Constr. Co. v. Eber, 7 Ohio L. Abs. S8 (gzz); Lake Shore Electric Co.
v. Ordway, 24 Ohio App. 317, 156 N.E. 235, 40 Ohio L. Abs. 763 (z926); Presti v.
Cleveland Ry., z6 Ohio App. 536, i6o N.E. 508 (1928); Sperry v. Allen, 55 Ohio C.C.
(N.S.) Z25, 24 Ohio C.D. 30Z (191).
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Apparently, basing their decisions on an estoppel theory, these courts
would not allow the counsel whose censurable actions were responsible
for the impropriety to complain of it on appeal, since he himself began
the improper line of argument. One such court,' when the record was
in doubt, went so far as to assume that an argument had been in answer
to some improper matter introduced by the other side. This tribunal
reasoned that if the trial judge, who has wide discretionary powers, did
not order the argument stricken, it must have been induced by the
opposing counsel. Directly contra to the above case is Cincinnati Gas
& Electric Co. v. Coffelder.' The court there held that it would not
attempt to apportion the blame for improper remarks made by both
attorneys. The trial court, according to this decision, had a non-dis-
cretionary duty to stop the offender, and admonish the jury to disregard
what had been said. While this case stands alone in Ohio in regard to
improper arguments based on prior impropriety invited by an opponent,
there are cases which might have been decided differently had not the
jury been properly instructed after the unwarranted statement.'
Most Ohio decisions have been based on the idea that the improper
statement was not prejudicial. 9 The reasoning seems to have been that
coupled together the two improprieties neutralized each other, and
neither one unduly influenced the jury.'" One judge said that when
there were indecorous remarks made by both sides the jury simply
looked through the statements and viewed them "as interesting but not
especially convincing."'"
Argument reprehensible because it contained facts not in the evi-
dence was justified in Ross v. State' by the fact that opposing counsel
'Lake Shore Electric Co. v. Ordway, 24 Ohio App. 317, 156 N.E. 235, 40 Ohio L.
Abs. 763 (igz6). In Champney v. Braun, 23 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 533, 34. Ohio C.D. 363
(igz), the court reasoned in much the same way. It also gave weight to the liberality
given counsel in his argument. As dictum the court in St. Bernard v. Gohman, so Ohio
App. 40Z, 31 Ohio C.A. 273 (igig), said that the trial court was better able to determine
whether the argument was justified by anything said by the opposite side.
'ii Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 289, 31 Ohio C.C. 26, afi'd, without opinion, 83 Ohio St. 51s,
94 N.E. 1104 (1g1).
aBruno v. Petrecca, 65 Ohio App. 257, 18 Ohio Op. 430 (194o)5 Dorger v. State
40 Ohio App. 45, 179 N.E. 4.3 ('93').
'Metzler v. Youngstown, 23 Ohio L. Abs. 586 (936) ;Bruno v. Petrecca, 65 Ohio
App. 257, 18 Ohio Op. 430 (594o)i Wynne v. Cincinnati Traction Co., aS Ohio N.P.
(N.S.) 409, z6 Ohio Dec. 389 (1914)5 Palmer v. Peak, io4. Ohio St. 603, 136 N.E. 884
(1922).
8 Dorger v. State, 40 Ohio App. 415, 179 N.E. 143 (93i). Here, both counsel used
highly improper argument by trying to arouse in the jury sympathy for the children of the
parties and interested persons.
'Cleveland Worsted Mills v. Coates, 26 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 353, 30 Ohio C.D. 6xo
(1916). An earlier case had said, however, that when there was wrangling back and forth
between the two attorneys, the jury could not get an unbiased view of the facts, and a new
trial was necessary. Columbus Ry. v. Conner, 6 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 361, 17 Ohio C.D. 229
(19o5).
' 22 Ohio App. 304, 153 N.E. 865 (1926).
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made challenging statements which could not be adequately answered
in any other way.
The Ohio courts have never required that an attorney object to
impropriety in order that he may retaliate by improper argument. Like-
wise good faith on the part of the answering attorney has not been
necessary. As long as the argument complained of was reasonable, in
direct relation to, and concerning improper remarks introduced by the
opponent, it has been allowed.' 3
The courts have left unanswered the question of whether counsel
has an absolute right to answer in an improper manner the abusive
remarks of his opponent.' 4 While there is no authority on the subject
this matter would probably be left to the discretion of the trial court.
It is difficult to say whether or not this rule concerning improper
argument in reply to improper remarks is a good one or not. It offers
to the counsel a chance to counter-balance the effect of censurable
statements to which he did not object, and which, therefore, he could
not assign as error on an appeal. At the same time, however, the
practice gives an attorney, who is not acting in good faith, a chance to
sit back after reprehensible discussion by his adversary, and wait-then
when the time is ripe he may reply, using improper and indecorous
language which he hopes may influence the jury in favor of his client.
R.C.
13Exceptions are Cincinnati Gas and Electric Co. v. Coffelder, supra, note 6; and
Columbus Railway v. Conner, 6 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 36!, 17 Ohio C.D. 229 (x9o5).
"If the argument complained of cannot be correlated with, and is not in direct
relation to the improper argument of complainant, it will be held to be reversible error if
prejudicial. Kokomo Steel and Wire Co. v. Ramseyer, 19o Ind. 19z, xz8 N.E. 844
(19zo); Green v. Laclair, 91 Vt. 23, 99 Atl. z4. (i9i6).
